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Snooping, Privacy and Precedent in Ontario
Employees of large organizations with access to confidential personal files
sometimes succumb to the temptation to snoop on what their neighbours, friends or
acquaintances are up to. They may do so for a variety of reasons ranging from a
wish to expose wrongdoing to mere idle curiosity. Employers typically have poli-
cies against such activities and may discipline an employee who is caught out. In
extreme cases the police may even be called in, although the criminal law is not
that helpful. The misconduct may not fall neatly under the Criminal Code’s restric-
tive definition of unauthorized use of a computer,1 nor amount to theft, fraud or
criminal breach of trust — they all involve dealing with property or a “thing,” and
confidential information is neither.2
What of the civil law? The Uniform Law Conference of Canada has issued a
model Privacy Act3 and half the provinces — British Columbia, Manitoba, New-
foundland and Labrador, Quebec, and Saskatchewan — have similar laws often
modelled on it. Snooping there would allow the victim to sue in tort for invasion of
privacy. So in Bigstone v. St. Pierre4 an employee of a Saskatchewan power utility
had nosed round customer billing records to gather information for an ultimately
successful personal lawsuit she was engaged in. During the trial the employee ad-
mitted her snooping and was then sued by the unsuccessful defendant under Sas-
katchewan’s Privacy Act.5 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upheld a lower court
ruling letting the case go to trial.
Ontario lacks such legislation and a case decided around the same time as
Bigstone reached the opposite result. In Jones v. Tsige6 a bank employee used her
computer on 174 occasions over four years to access and look at the bank account
of an employee at another branch of the bank. The snoop was living with the vic-
tim’s ex-husband and apparently wanted to know what alimony he was paying.
When her employer discovered her misconduct, she admitted having no legitimate
reason to access the account and promised to be good in future. The bank disci-
plined but did not fire her. The snoopee started an action for damages and an in-
1 Criminal Code, s. 342.1.
2 R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963.
3 Online: http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1p3.
4 2011 SKCA 34.
5 R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24.
6 2011 ONSC 1475.
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junction but quickly found out, if she hadn’t known till then, that Ontario is not
Saskatchewan. Her action was dismissed for disclosing no actionable wrong. Whit-
aker J. in the Superior Court found the snoop owed the plaintiff no fiduciary duty,
and further held that no action lay for breach of privacy at common law either. In
his view, the customer had an adequate administrative remedy in being able to
complain to the Privacy Commissioner under the federal Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).7 Also pointing to three On-
tario statutes that dealt with various aspects of privacy, the judge thought the field
was “not an area of law that requires ‘judge-made’ rights and obligations”:
“[s]tatutory schemes that govern privacy issues are, for the most part, carefully
nuanced and designed to balance practical concerns and needs in an industry-spe-
cific fashion.”8
This last point can cut both ways. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has
endorsed the principle adopted by other Commonwealth courts that “the evolution
of Judge-made law may be influenced by the ideas of the legislature as reflected in
contemporary statutes and by other current trends.”9 More compendiously,
“[w]here over a period of years there can be discerned a steady trend in legislation
which reflects the view of successive Parliaments as to what the public interest
demands in a particular field of law, development of the common law in that part of
the same field which has been left to it ought to proceed upon a parallel rather than
a diverging course.”10 The course of federal and provincial privacy legislation, in-
cluding the Privacy Acts of other provinces, might therefore suggest that the com-
mon law should move to protect rather than repel privacy interests.
Before commenting on the privacy claim, we should note that the plaintiff,
somewhat surprisingly, chose to rest her alternative claim on a breach of fiduciary
duty rather than on a breach of confidence. Banks clearly owe their customers a
duty of confidentiality, which includes not granting unauthorized access to a cus-
tomer’s account and personal information. That contractual duty is supplemented
by a similar equitable duty that individual bank employees owe to customers. Al-
though the only relationship between the snoop and the customer was through the
snoop’s employer, duties of confidence have been imposed even where parties had
no prior relationship at all. Thus the nocturnal thief who jumps a fence to take
cuttings from trees to plant on his own property, the eavesdropper who overhears
and takes advantage of conversations he knows are confidential, and the industrial
spy who overflies to take x-ray photographs of the building’s interior are all liable
to the usual injunction, damages and unjust enrichment relief at the suit of the af-
7 S.C. 2000, c. 5.
8 Supra n 1 at [56]. The three statutes the judge mentioned (ibid. at [29]) were the Per-
sonal Health Information Protection Act, S.O. 2004, c. 3, the Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, and the Municipal Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56. How any of these
applied to the plaintiff is not indicated.
9 Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 129
at 151.
10 Erven Warnink BV v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] A.C. 731 , 743 (H.L.),
also approved in Canson, ibid.
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fected property owner or speaker.11 Since an employer’s duty can be fulfilled only
through its employees, the case for imposing a direct duty of confidence on em-
ployees is clear. An employee who accesses and looks at a customer’s personal and
financial information for non-banking reasons obviously breaches that duty, per-
haps implicating the bank vicariously and subjecting both parties to similar reme-
dies, including punitive damages.12
Privacy and confidentiality interests overlap, as English courts have noted
when extending the breach of confidence action to protect privacy interests.
Whether the creation of a whole new tort or the extension of an existing action is a
better way of vindicating privacy interest is more a question of taste than substance.
In creating a new tort of commercial appropriation of personality in 1973, the On-
tario Court of Appeal could have anchored it in a concept of privacy but, after
reviewing American and Commonwealth case law and academic writing, as well as
noting the Privacy Acts of British Columbia and Manitoba, preferred to develop
appropriation as an autonomous concept.13 While recognizing that misappropria-
tion protects economic rather than personal interests, a number of Canadian courts,
including some in Ontario, similarly extended the common law to vindicate aspects
of personal privacy. Quebec’s civil law also protects dignity and privacy interests,
as the Supreme Court of Canada demonstrated in upholding a damages award
against a journal that had illustrated an article with a photograph of an ordinary
member of the public going about her business on a public street.14 Likewise in
England, the deprivation that tabloid readers feel in not being able to peruse photo-
graphs of supermodels exiting rehab clinics, best-selling authors shopping with
their children, or Formula 1 bosses partying in their basements, is thought to be
outweighed by the more substantial privacy interests of the subjects involved.15
The presence of PIPEDA-like legislation has not hindered the development of the
English action, any more than the presence of privacy legislation that included pro-
tection against commercial appropriation of personality hindered the acceptance of
the corresponding common law tort in provinces with such legislation.16
Some Ontario courts have granted remedies for invasion of privacy, and others
have refused to strike such actions summarily, as Whitaker J. indeed noted in Jones
11 Franklin v. Giddins, [1978] Qd. R. 72 (S.C.); Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd.,
[1990] 1 A.C. 109 , 281 (H.L.); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rolfe, 431 F. 2d
1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
12 Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, allowing punitive damages to be awarded for
breaches of an equitable duty.
13 Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 15 (Ont. C.A.); var’ing (1971),
25 D.L.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. H.C.J.); see generally, D. Vaver, Intellectual Property: Copy-
right, Patents, Trade-marks, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), 436–444.
14 Aubry v. Vice-Versa Inc., [1998] 1S.C.R. 591.
15 Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457, [2004] UKHL 22; Murray v. Big Pictures
(UK) Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ 446; Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2008]
EWHC 1777.
16 Jones v. Daniels (1986), 11 C.P.R. (3d) 544 (B.C.S.C.).
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v. Tsige.17 In such a case, the claim should not be struck out summarily but the new
point of law should be left for decision at trial on “a full factual record and finding
of fact made by a trier of fact on that record.”18
Why then did the judge depart from the latter cases and dismiss the case sum-
marily? He said he was justified in doing so because of the “binding and disposi-
tive” authority of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Euteneier v. Lee.19
Euteneier involved negligence, assault and Charter claims against the police for
intrusive handling of an arrested individual. The “binding and dispositive” lan-
guage to which Whitaker J. referred was a single sentence in the Court of Appeal’s
judgment, where the court said that plaintiff’s counsel “properly conceded in oral
argument before this court that there is no ‘free-standing’ right to dignity or privacy
under the Charter or at common law.”20 But counsel’s concession during argument
about a cause of action that is neither pleaded nor in issue is not a “binding and
dispositive decision” on anything, whether the concession is called “proper” or not.
Is it conceivable the Court of Appeal itself would summarily dismiss a case on
completely different facts from Eutenier that specifically pleaded a common law
right to privacy, by saying that the “holding” in Euteneier foreclosed the point?
The weight given to reasons that are not essential to a decision has varied over
the years. A century ago, in refusing to follow comments in an earlier Supreme
Court judgment, Taschereau C.J.C. said: 
Anything that may be found in the report of that case (and of any case) that
was not necessary for the determination of the controverted points therein is
obiter and not binding as authority. And the number of judges who con-
curred in such obiter does not make it anything else. Then a simple concur-
rence is nothing more than a concurrence in the conclusions, or at most in
the reasons upon which exclusively the points actually determined are
based.21
The Supreme Court has since softened its line on when dicta should be fol-
lowed. All obiter dicta are not born equal. Some are more persuasive than others:
those “obviously intended for guidance . . . should be accepted as authoritative,” at
least by lower courts.22 Binnie J. continued: 
Beyond that, there will be commentary, examples or exposition that are in-
tended to be helpful and may be found to be persuasive, but are certainly not
“binding” [no matter how incidental to the main point of the case or how far
they were removed from the dispositive facts and principles of law]. The
objective of the exercise is to promote certainty in the law, not to stifle its
growth and creativity. The notion that each phrase in a judgment of this
Court should be treated as if enacted in a statute is not supported by the
17 See particularly Somwar v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd., 2006 CanLII 202
and Nitsopoulos v. Wong, 2008 CanLII 45407, both cited and discussed by Whitaker J.
18 Romano v. D’Onofrio (2005), 77 O.R. (3d) 583 at [12] (C.A.), foll’d in Central Sun
Mining Inc. v. Vector Engineering Inc., 2011 ONSC 1439 at [53].
19 2005 CanLII 33024, 77 O.R. (3d) 621 (C.A.); see Jones, supra n 1 at [55].
20 Euteneier, ibid. at [63].
21 Griffin v. Toronto Ry., 33 S.C.R. 39, 1902 CarswellNat 35 at [6].
22 R. v. Henry, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 at [57].
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cases and is inconsistent with the basic fundamental principle that the com-
mon law develops by experience.23
The last sentence applies to the comment in Eutenier: an “off-the-cuff” sen-
tence that comes without the benefit of contested argument or on a concession by
counsel, often made for tactical reasons, is no safe guide to anything.24 If the power
of precedent is “the power of the beaten track”,25 Eutenier hardly creases the
ground.
Jones v. Tsige is little better on the substantive privacy issue. This Note will
not rehearse the arguments for and against remedying some or all breaches of pri-
vacy, for that is done elsewhere.26 In deciding nearly 40 years ago whether or not
the common law in Ontario should recognize a concept of commercial appropria-
tion of personality, the Ontario Court of Appeal conducted a wide-ranging histori-
cal review of Commonwealth and American case law and jurisprudence and was
undeterred by the absence of statutory recognition of such a right in Ontario. The
Superior Court should have conducted a similar review. Instead it elevated a con-
cession by counsel in a non-privacy case over a series of Ontario cases of co-ordi-
nate authority affirming a privacy tort or its possibility, and chose to neglect devel-
opments in the rest of Canada, the Commonwealth,27 and the United States. The
result may be “binding and dispositive” for local small claims courts, but not much
else. The story of privacy law in Ontario still remains to be written.
DAVID VAVER
23 Ibid.; discussed in R. v. Prokofiew, 2010 ONCA 423 at [18]–[25] before declining to
follow obiter in Supreme Court.
24 Cf. Bacon v. Automattic Inc., [2011] EWHC 1072 at [45] (Q.B.).
25 B. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (Yale U.P., 1924), 62.
26 Starting over a century ago with S. Warren & L. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” 9
Harv. L.R. 193 (1890); W. Prosser, “Privacy” 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960); D. Solove,
Understanding Privacy (Cambridge, Mass. & London, England: Harvard U.P. 2008);
cf. R. Brown, “Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation and Tort Law” (2006)
43 Alta. L.Rev. 589.
27 Dyne Holdings Ltd. v. Royal Insurance Company of Canada, 1996 CanLII 3672
(P.E.I., A.D.); Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2007] UKHL 21; Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1
N.Z.L.R. 1 (C.A.); Doe v. ABC, [2007] VCC 281. The authority is not all one way: see,
e.g., Hung v. Gardiner, 2002 BCSC 1234.
